This paper investigates how the feasibility of migration affects governments' optimal fiscal policies. We assume that households migrate toward economies where their welfare is higher, governments choose taxes and public expenditures to maximize a weighted sum of the households' welfare, welfare is increasing in public expenditures, and only distortionary labor income taxes are available. In isolated economies, the optimal fiscal policy implies that some households are net fiscal contributors, while other households are net fiscal beneficiaries. When households can migrate, however, governments compete for the households which are net fiscal contributors, and modify the fiscal policy in their favor, lowering their taxes and net fiscal contribution, and increasing their welfare. The magnitude of the effect increases with the sensitivity of migration to welfare. In the limiting case of free mobility, all households are zero net fiscal contributors. As to the patterns of migration, the model predicts that, with high migration costs, all households migrate toward the same high-productivity countries, which benefits low-productivity households, whereas with low migration costs, households with different productivities migrate toward different countries, which benefits high-productivity households.
Introduction
Migration and fiscal policy interact along several important dimensions. An extended literature, both theoretical and empirical, documents the response of migration and mobile factors to fiscal policy. Most relevantly for this paper, Razin and Sadka (2001, Part II) argue that the welfare state drives in low-skill migration and drives out high-skill migration. Several papers, like Storesletten (2000) , focus on how migration affects fiscal variables, debt in particular, for given fiscal policies. Others, like Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) , study how migration affects fiscal policy from a political economy perspective. This paper investigates how the feasibility of migration affects the fiscal policies optimally set by governments, directly addressing some important empirical findings described in the survey of fiscal competition and factor mobility of Wildasin (2006) .
We emphasize an effect leading to a symmetric general change of fiscal policies across all countries in response to migration feasibility. We assume that households migrate toward economies where their welfare is higher, governments choose taxes and public expenditures to maximize a weighted sum of the households' welfare, welfare is increasing in public expenditures, and only distortionary labor income taxes are available. The main result follows from the concept of a household's net fiscal contribution (or net fiscal burden), the difference between the taxes that the household pays to the government and the expenditures sustained by the government for that specific household. The addition of a positive net fiscal contributor to an economy benefits all other households in the economy, since it allows the government to decrease taxes or to increase public expenditures for all other households, while the addition of a net fiscal beneficiary hurts all other households. Hence, in their aim of maximizing a weighted sum of the households' welfare, governments have an incentive to attract net fiscal contributors and to discourage net fiscal beneficiaries. They do so by modifying the fiscal policy in favor of net fiscal contributors, lowering their taxes and net fiscal contribution, and increasing their welfare. In a general equilibrium where all economies are identical and all governments compete for net fiscal contributors, there are no migration flows, and the only effect is a general change of fiscal policies in favor of net fiscal contributors and at the expenses of net fiscal beneficiaries.
The magnitude of the effect depends on how feasible is migration. The more households are able and willing to migrate toward economies where their welfare is higher, the stronger is the effect. We model as exogenous the sensitivity of migration to welfare, which measures the magnitude of migration flows in response to welfare differences across economies. If households cannot migrate, the effect does not occur. As the sensitivity of migration to welfare increases, the magnitude of the effect increases, the equilibrium fiscal contribution of positive net fiscal contributors decreases, while the equilibrium fiscal contribution of fiscal beneficiaries increases. In the limiting case of free mobility, all households are zero net fiscal contributors.
The model predicts that, the more households are able and willing to migrate into and out of an economy, the smaller should be the observed differences across households' net fiscal contributions. Hence, differences across households' net fiscal contributions should be much smaller for economies like states and provinces, where households are more able and willing to migrate, than for economies like countries where the sensitivity of migration to welfare differences is much smaller. Also, differences across households' net fiscal contributions should decrease over time if the ability and willingness of households to migrate in response to welfare differences across countries increases.
The model with heterogeneous distributions of households across countries also provides insightful predictions as to the patterns of migration and the dynamics of households' welfare. With high barriers and costs of migration, all households migrate toward the same high-productivity countries, which benefits low-productivity households, whereas with low barriers and costs of migration, households with different productivities migrate toward different countries, which benefits high-productivity households. With high mobility, then, the model delivers a Tiebout outcome, where each country is populated by one type of household and specialize adopting fiscal policies optimal for that type.
The paper is a novel attempt to bridge two separate literatures. On one hand, it directly contributes to the literature on optimal policy with commitment, which stems from Lucas and Stokey (1983) , extending its normative analysis to allow for migration. On the other, it adopts a general equilibrium framework and characterizes the associated Ramsey equilibrium to derive and extend analytical results present in the literature of fiscal externality and competition, of which Myers (1990) , Wildasin (1991) , Wilson (1999) , and Honkapohja and Turunen-Red (2004) are recent examples. Both the adoption of the Ramsey equilibrium approach and the choice of modeling migration as a function of households' welfare should significantly help future work on the interaction between fiscal competition and factor mobility.
In what follows, Section 2 describes the model; Section 3 defines the competitive equilibrium; Section 4 characterizes the optimal competitive equilibrium or Ramsey equilibrium; Section 5 determines the effect of migration feasibility on optimal fiscal policy and derives the main results; Section 6 studies the model predictions as to migration patterns and welfare dynamics in the case of heterogeneous distributions of households across countries; and Section 7 concludes.
Model
The model is a one-period economy with several identical countries. In each country, there is a government, and I different types of households. Households of the same type are identical, while households of different types differ only as to their labor productivity. Let w i > 0 be the number of type i households, where i∈I w i = 1.
Each type i household is endowed with n > 0 hours, and choose to work n i ∈ [0, n] hours. Each hour of work produces x i > 0 units of a non-storable consumption good. Its private consumption is c i ≥ 0, while its per-capita public consumption is g ≥ 0, independently of its type. The feasibility constraint is then
Public consumption must be financed through distortionary labor income taxes. Let τ i < 1 be the tax rate on labor income of type i households. Households' preferences are described by the utility function u(c, n, g), which is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in its first and third arguments c and g, strictly decreasing in its second argument n, and strictly concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions lim c→0 u c (c, n, g) = ∞ for all n, g, lim n→n u n (c, n, g) = −∞ for all c, g, and lim g→0 u g (c, n, g) = ∞ for all c, n. Alternatively, in place of the second condition, one could assume that lim n→+∞ u n (c, n, g) = −∞ for all c, g, and that n is large enough so that n < n is optimal in all the following optimization problems. The government's objective function is a weighted average of the households' utility functions. Let π i > 0 be the weight of type i households in the government's utility function, where i∈I π i = 1.
The timing of the events is as follows. First, governments commit to a fiscal policy {g, τ i } i∈I , then households choose whether to migrate or remain in their own country, and finally households choose the private allocation {c i , n i } i∈I .
Proceeding backward, in the third stage, households solve a simple optimization problem, and choose their equilibrium allocation and utility.
In the second stage, given their optimal strategy in the third stage, households choose whether to migrate based on a comparison between their equilibrium utility in their own country and in other countries, taking into account all barriers and costs of migration. We model this decision assuming that the number of type i households in each country is a continuously differentiable, increasing function w i (u(c i , n i , g)) of their equilibrium utility in that country, for given equilibrium utility in other countries. For convenience, we do not make explicit the dependence of w i on type i households' equilibrium utility in other countries. We refer to the derivatives w ′ i (u(c i , n i , g)) as the sensitivities of migration to welfare. When w ′ i = 0, there is no migration. The larger the sensitivities w ′ i , the larger the response of the number of type i households to changes in their equilibrium utility. In a more explicit model, the function w i (u(c i , n i , g)) would depend on the barriers and costs of migration as well as the number of countries. The larger the number of countries and the smaller the costs of migration, the larger the sensitivities w ′ i . In the first stage, given the households' optimal strategies in the second and third stage, and given the fiscal policy of other governments, the government of each country chooses its fiscal policy to maximize its objective function. The government is constrained to choose among the set of fiscal policies which lead to a competitive equilibrium. Equivalently, the government chooses the Ramsey equilibrium, the competitive equilibrium where its utility is highest. We define it Ramsey equilibrium because the government's utility function only depends on the households' utility functions.
So far, we have described a model with one country, where all the interaction with other countries is summarized by the functions w i (u(c i , n i , g)). We now make use of the assumption that all countries are identical. We focus on a symmetrical equilibrium where all governments choose the same fiscal policy and the same Ramsey equilibrium. In this case, each household receives the same utility in all countries, no household migrates in equilibrium, and the number of type i households w i in each country is constant and equal to an exogenous value w i > 0. Hence, the effect of a general decrease in the costs of migration across all countries is to increase the sensitivities w ′ i of migration to welfare without affecting the number of type i households w i .
Competitive equilibria
To study the optimization problem faced by the government in the first stage, we first introduce competitive equilibria. A competitive equilibrium is an allocation {c i ≥ 0, n i ∈ [0, n], g ≥ 0} i∈I , together with tax rates {τ i < 1} i∈I such that:
• Given {g, τ i } i∈I , {c i , n i } i∈I solve the following households' problems:
• The market for consumption goods is in equilibrium:
By Walras' Law, the households' budget constraints and the consumption goods market equilibrium condition imply that the government budget constraint is satisfied.
From the necessary conditions of the household's problem,
These conditions, evaluated in equilibrium, express the tax rates as functions of the allocation. Substituting the previous expressions for the tax rates into the households' budget constraints, we obtain the implementability constraints
An allocation {c i ≥ 0, n i ∈ [0, n], g ≥ 0} i∈I is implementable if it satisfies the feasibility constraint (1) with equality and the implementability constraints (2). As in Lucas and Stokey (1983) , competitive equilibria are implementable allocations together with their associated tax rates.
Ramsey equilibrium
In the first stage, the government chooses the Ramsey equilibrium, the competitive equilibrium where its utility is highest. The government takes into account the households' responses in the second and third stage to its choices, and takes as given the choices of governments in other countries. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983) , the allocation of the Ramsey equilibrium maximizes the government's utility function among implementable allocations:
Notice that we write the feasibility constraint with inequality instead of equality. This allows to determine the sign of the associated multiplier without affecting the solution, since the feasibility constraint is binding at the optimum.
The Lagrangian is
where λ i , i ∈ I, are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the implementability constraints, and µ ≥ 0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint.
Assuming that the solution satisfies c i > 0, n i ∈ (0, n) and g > 0, and that it satisfies the feasibility constraint with equality, the necessary conditions are
where the arguments of the functions have been suppressed for readability. The previous is a system of 2 + 3I equations in the 2 + 3I unknowns {c i , n i , g,λ i , µ} i∈I . So far, we have not made any reference to the other countries. We now recall that all countries are identical, and we focus on a symmetrical equilibrium where all governments choose the same fiscal policy and the same Ramsey equilibrium. Then, each household receives the same utility in all countries, no household migrates in equilibrium, and the number of type i households w i in each country is constant and equal to w i > 0. We then substitute w i = w i in the previous system.
The effect of migration feasibility on optimal fiscal policy
To illustrate the key mechanism at work, we restrict our attention to the benchmark economy with the following utility function:
where A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), Φ > 0 and ϕ > 0. The utility function is separable in its three arguments, and the elasticity of substitution between private and public consumption is constant and equal to 1. Although lim n→n u n (c, n, g) = −Φn ϕ > −∞ we assume that n is large enough so that the solution is still described by the necessary conditions (3).
Recall that the population weights w i are constant and equal to w i in symmetrical equilibria where all countries implement the same fiscal policy. In addition, assume that the sensitivities w ′ i are constant and equal to γw i , γ ≥ 0, so the population weights are locally linear in welfare.
We are interested in the equilibrium effects of changes in the sensitivity γ of migration to welfare. We first establish that average variables (and, equivalently, aggregate variables) do not depend on γ.
Notice that u cc (c, n, g)c = −u c (c, n, g), u nn (c, n, g) = ϕu n (c, n, g) and all the cross second derivatives are equal to zero. Then, the necessary conditions (3) become
Notice that both the first and the third equation imply that µ = 0, so µ > 0. From the implementability constraint,
(5) so labor n i only depends on preferences' parameters and does not depend on γ. Also, since both labor n i = n and public consumption g are the same for all types of households, only differences in private consumption c i may determine differences in welfare u(c i , n i , g) across households.
Let average productivity x and average production y be
Since labor n and average productivity x do not depend on γ, average production y does not depend of γeither.
Multiplying the first-order condition for c i by c i , summing across types, and using the goods market equilibrium condition, we obtain
Multiplying the first-order condition for g by g, and using the goods market equilibrium condition, we obtain
Summing up the two previous equations, and using the goods market equilibrium conditions,
Recalling that average production y does not depend on γ, µ does not depend on γ either. Then,
and similarly
so average private consumption c and public consumption g are constant fractions α and 1 − α of average production y, and do not depend on γ.
We are now ready to derive the equilibrium effect of changes in γ. It is convenient to introduce the concept of net fiscal contribution (or net fiscal burden). Let δ i ≡ τ i x i n i −g be the net fiscal contribution of type i households. Let type i households be called net fiscal contributors if δ i > 0, and net fiscal beneficiaries if δ i < 0. From the government's budget constraint, i∈I w i δ i = 0, so if some types of households are net fiscal contributors, some other types of households are net fiscal beneficiaries. Also, using the households' budget constraints, δ i = x i n i − c i − g.
From the first-order condition for consumption,
Recalling that n i , g and µ do not depend on γ,
so consumption c i and welfare u(c i , n i , g) are increasing with γ for net fiscal contributors, while they are decreasing with γ for net fiscal beneficiaries.
Moreover, since δ i = x i n i − c i − g and (1 − τ i )x i n i = c i , the net fiscal contribution and the tax rate is decreasing with γfor net fiscal contributors while they are increasing with γfor net fiscal beneficiaries. In the limiting case that γ→ ∞,δ i = x i n i − c i − g → 0, so the net fiscal contributions τ i x i n i − g of all types of households tend to zero. The case γ→ ∞ can be interpreted as the case with free mobility and a very small country relative to the rest of the world (or an infinite number of countries). This is the fundamental insight of the model. When migration is not feasible (γ= 0), the optimal fiscal policy implies that some households are net fiscal contributors while the other are net fiscal beneficiaries. Clearly, if the number of net fiscal contributors could increase, taxes could decrease and public consumption could increase, so all households would benefit. Hence, when migration is feasible (γ>0), the government has an extra-incentive to attract net fiscal contributors, and tilts its fiscal policy in their favor, decreasing their net fiscal contribution and their tax rate, and increasing their welfare. The reverse is true for net fiscal beneficiaries. The larger the sensitivity of migration to welfare γ, the larger this effect. In the limiting case that γ→ ∞, all households are zero net fiscal contributors.
To help intuition, it is useful to consider the case where households receive the same weight in the government's utility function, so π i = w i for i ∈ I. In this case,
so consumption c i and welfare u(c i , n i , g) are increasing in productivity x i . Then,
so the net fiscal contribution δ i is increasing in productivity x i as well. Using i∈I w i δ i = 0 it follows that δ i > 0 for households with productivity higher than a threshold, and δ i < 0 for households with productivity lower than the threshold. In this case, then, governments compete to attract high productivity households and to discourage low productivity households, and modify their fiscal policy accordingly. Also, in this case, we can derive how migration feasibility affects social welfare as expressed by the government's utility function. Recalling that n i , g and µ do not depend on γ,
Recall that both consumption c i and the net fiscal contribution δ i are increasing in productivity x i , so consumption and the net fiscal contribution are increasing functions of each other. It follows that
where the last equality follows from i∈I π i δ i = i∈I w i δ i = 0. Equivalently, with a slight abuse of notation,
where the last equality follows from E(δ) = i∈I π i δ i = i∈I w i δ i = 0. Hence, as the sensitivity γ of migration to welfare increases, the equilibrium social welfare decreases.
Heterogeneous countries
Although the model is designed to study the static effect of migration feasibility on fiscal policy, it is interesting to investigate what it suggests as to where households tend to migrate and how their welfare tends to evolve over time.
To address this issue, we abandon the assumption of identical countries, and consider the case where the distribution of types of households differs across countries. We focus on the case where all households living in a country receive the same weight in the government's utility function, so π i = w i for i ∈ I. The necessary conditions (4) continue to describe the equilibrium of the model in this case of heterogeneous countries as well, with the population weights {w i } i∈I now referring to the equilibrium distribution of types of households. Notice that the equilibrium distribution of types of households is no longer invariant to changes in the sensitivity γ of migration to welfare, or to changes in other parameter values, so the analysis in this section needs to be conducted maintaining all parameter values constant.
As a starting point of analysis, we assume that each type of households migrates toward the country where its welfare u(c i , n i , g) is the highest, and that, in each country, the population weights {w i } i∈I change over time accordingly. We then aim at characterizing how the welfare of a household depends on the distribution of types of households living in a country.
A first important result is that the welfare u(c i , n i , g) of a household depends on the distribution of types of households living in a country only indirectly through their average productivity x ≡ i∈I w i x i . To see it, notice that c i , n i , g, µ, y, are determined by the system of equations (5), (7) (8), (10), and (11), and notice that the system depends on the distribution of types of households only indirectly through their average productivity x.
As a corollary of this result, we incidentally observe that, if all countries have the same average productivity, each type of household receives the same utility in all countries, and no household migrates in equilibrium. Hence, our analysis in Section 5 for the case of identical countries, applies to the case of heterogeneous countries with identical average productivity as well.
Let us return to the general case of heterogeneous countries with possibly different average productivities. In light of the previous result, our aim becomes to characterize how the welfare of a household depends on the average productivity of the households living in a country. As shown in the Appendix, we can derive the following expression for consumption:
and, then, evaluate how the welfare u(c i , n i , g) of a type i household depends on the average productivity x of the households living in a country:
The denominator of the last term is always positive, provided that consumption c i given by equation (12) is positive. For low values of γ, the numerator is positive for all types of households, so all types of households are better off living in countries with higher average productivity x. For high values of γ, however, the numerator becomes negative for the types of households with lower productivities x i . Hence, for high values of γ, the more productive households are better off in countries with higher average productivity x, whereas the less productive households are better off in countries with lower average productivity x.
To better understand this somewhat surprising result, recall that labor
never depends on average productivity x, and that public consumption g = (1 − α)y = (1 − α)xn is always increasing in average productivity x. Also, notice from equation (12) that consumption c i is increasing in average productivity x for low values of γ (for values such that α − Aαγ(1 − α) > 0), whereas it is decreasing for higher values of γ.
Hence, for low values of γ, both private consumption c i and public consumption g are increasing in average productivity x, so the welfare u(c i , n i , g) of all types of households increases with average productivity x as well. This is evident in the case that γ = 0, where consumption c i = αy = αxn is a constant fraction of average production y. For low (but strictly positive) values of γ, then, the model implies that households of all types migrate toward the country with the highest average productivity x. Because of these migration flows, the average productivity x in that country converges over time to the world average productivity x. Then, the welfare of households initially living in high-productivity countries decreases over time, whereas the welfare of households initially living in low-productivity countries increases over time.
For higher values of γ, however, private consumption c i is decreasing in the average productivity x for the types of households with lower productivities x i , while public consumption g continues to be increasing. For sufficiently high values of γ, and for sufficiently low values of the productivities x i , the first effect (through c i ) outweighs the second effect (through g), so the welfare u(c i , n i , g) of the households with lower productivities x i decreases with average productivity x. This is evident in the limiting case that γ → ∞, where
so welfare u(c i , n i , g) increases with average productivity x for households with productivity x i greater than the average x, whereas it decreases with average productivity x for households with productivity x i less than the average x. For high values of γ, then, the model implies that higher-productivity households migrate toward higher-productivity countries, whereas lower-productivity ones migrate toward lower-productivity countries. Because of these migration flows, the welfare of all households increases over time.
To summarize, the model implies quite different dynamics and migration patterns depending on the value of the sensitivity γ of migration to welfare. For low (but strictly positive) values of γ, the model implies that households of all types slowly migrate and concentrate in the country with the highest average productivity x. For high values of γ, however, the model delivers a Tiebout result, implying that households migrate toward countries populated by households of their own type, and countries specialize adopting fiscal policies optimal for the type of households living there.
To explore some further normative implications of the model, suppose that, for low values of γ, the economy converges to an asymptotically stationary equilibrium where all households live together in the same country, whereas, for high values of γ, the economy converges to an asymptotically stationary equilibrium where households live separately in countries populated exclusively by households of one type. A question that arises naturally is whether households are better off in the stationary equilibrium with low or high sensitivity γof migration to welfare. This question has obvious normative implications since γis likely to depend on policy instruments that affect the costs and feasibility of migration.
In the stationary equilibrium, the average productivity x is equal to the world average productivity x in the case of low γ, whereas it is equal to the productivity x i of type i households in the case of high γ, so the welfare of a type i household is
1+ϕ for γlow A αlog αx i n+Aαγαx i n 1+Aαγ
for γhigh where we substituted x = x for the case of low γ, and x = x i for the case of high γ. To see things as clearly as possible, consider the two extreme cases of γ= 0 and γ→ ∞:
Clearly, a household is better off in the case of γ= 0 if and only if its productivity x i is less than the world average productivity x. Hence, households with lower than average productivities are better off with high barriers and costs of migration (low γ), in which case all types of households live together in the same country, whereas households with higher than average productivities are better off with low barriers and costs of migration (high γ), in which case different types of households live separately in different countries.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have emphasized an equilibrium effect of migration on optimal fiscal policy. The more feasible is migration, the larger is the change of fiscal policy in favor of net fiscal contributors and at the expense of net fiscal beneficiaries. In the limit, with free mobility, all households are zero net fiscal contributors. The model also predicts that, with high barriers and costs of migration, households of all types migrate toward the same highproductivity countries, which benefits low-productivity households, whereas with low barriers and costs of migration, different types of households migrate toward different countries, which benefits high-productivity households.
We hope this paper will stimulate work along several directions. In the paper, we modeled the migration decision by households with a reduced form function w i (u(c i , n i , g)) of their equilibrium utility. It would be interesting to study a game with several countries and limited mobility, and derive the structural determinants of the migration decision. We are confident that the main result will hold in the Nash equilibrium of the game. However, in the infinite repetition of the stage game, we expect subgame perfect equilibria will exist where countries cooperate and obtain better outcomes than the one of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Moreover, the tools and the results developed here should help characterize the optimal fiscal policy with migration in other relevant economies. For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that, in the case of different valuations of a public good across households, the more feasible is migration, the closer to the net fiscal contributors' preferences should be the provision of the public good. Also, the more feasible migration, the lower the tax rate for factors provided by net fiscal contributors, and the higher the tax rate for factors provided by net fiscal beneficiaries.
Finally, it would be important to evaluate empirically the quite precise, although normative, implication of the model. The model predicts that, the more households are able and willing to migrate into and out of an economy, the smaller should be the observed differences across households' net fiscal contributions. A very interesting test for the model would be comparing the differences across households' net fiscal contributions for states and provinces, where households are more able and willing to migrate, and for countries, where the sensitivity of migration to welfare differences is smaller.
A Derivation of equations (12) and (13)
Using equations (5) through (11), we can obtain the following expression for consumption c i : does not depend on x, that public consumption is equal to g = (1 −α)y = (1 −α)xn, and using the rule that the logarithm of a product is equal to the sum of the logarithms, we find: 
